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Abstract:  
 
This paper inquires into risk-consciousness as a political and moral imperative that is 
reconstituting the nature and purposes of university systems, policies and processes.  
It discusses the assumptions that underpin such systems, and how such systems, once 
operationalised, change the work that academics actually do. The aim is to draw 
attention to the extent to which the heightened risk-consciousness that has become a 
hallmark of the contemporary university works both to constrain and to enable what 
academics pay attention to, and how we understand what it means to be an effective 
manager, teacher or researcher.     
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Managing ‘Nearly Reasonable’ Risk in the Performative University 
 
 
‘The real trouble with this world of ours is not that it is an unreasonable world, nor 
even that it is a reasonable one. The commonest kind of trouble is that it is nearly 
reasonable but not quite.’  
G.K.Chesterton 
 
 
In declaring, almost a century ago, that most of our potential troubles are “nearly 
reasonable”, author G.K. Chesterton drew attention to the gap that exists between any 
rational plan or scheme we might devise for managing risk, and truth itself.  “Life”, 
said Chesterton, “is not an illogicality but it is a trap for logicians” (Chesterton, 1974: 
p.149). The implications of this do not seem to be well understood in the management 
of post-millennial universities, where hyper-rational systems of audit and 
accountability are expected to solve any and every potential ‘trouble’, real or 
imagined (see Strathern, 1997, 2000). Furthermore, investment in risk management 
through audit and accountability processes is growing at an exponential rate, despite 
the fact that our risk management systems, and the logic on which they are predicated, 
are based on the flawed premise that totally reasonable systems can and will solve all 
organisational problems. We turn present measures into future targets, in full 
anticipation that tomorrow’s productivity measures will look like today’s. And we do 
so despite the fact that the data we collect about the past are never fully up to the task 
of predicting the future, no matter how hard we try to map variables and take account 
of divergent trends and discontinuities (see Bernstein, 1998).  
 
This paper explores the impact of risk-consciousness on the nature and purposes of 
universities as organisational systems, the assumptions that underpin such systems, 
and the implications of all this for work that academics actually do. In taking risk-
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consciousness as a focus of inquiry rather than neo-liberalism, corporatism, 
managerialism, economic rationalism or any other kind of ‘ism’, the paper seeks an 
alternative location from which to understand how it has become possible to think the 
imperative to “coercive commensurability” (Brenneis, 1999) that governs universities 
after the retreat of the welfare state. The aim is to draw attention to the extent to 
which risk-consciousness as a as “a new moral climate of politics” (Giddens, 2002: 
29) has reconstituted universities as performative organisations, that is, as 
organisations whose quality and productivity can and must be rendered calculable 
both within and outside themselves. Put another way, the objective is to indicate how 
risk consciousness works both to constrain and to enable what academics pay 
attention to, and in doing so works as logic for understanding what it means to be an 
effective teacher or researcher.      
 
There are three tasks undertaken in the paper to serve this purpose. First, the paper 
explores risk-consciousness as activity mobilised by accusations from outside the 
university sector. The second moves to consider more closely how risk management 
works as a “regime of truth” (Foucault, 1979) within the contemporary university,   
drawing on higher degree research training to provide examples this logic at work in 
the constitution of effective management of the university’s activities. The paper then   
considers implications for the work that academics actually do.  
 
Risk events and universities  
 
As an entrée to the exploration of risk as a mobiliser of university sector activity, it is 
useful to consider a moment when media coverage renders a particular university ‘at 
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risk’. Fortunately for this paper but unfortunately for the sector, there is no shortage of 
stories about a singular university where the risk cat has escaped the management bag. 
A Google search conducted at the time of writing revealed 8.8 million sources 
relevant to ‘university scandal’. Of a shorter list of half a million or so reports 
pertaining to incidents in Western universities in more recent times, many contained 
reports or allegations of dubious activity such as fraud (including cheating, bogus 
degrees, bogus testing, plagiarism), low literacy levels, sexual misconduct, doubts 
about research integrity, unfairness or abuse of  process (including bullying), and 
financial mismanagement (including bribery).  
 
Specific instances of these allegations and the effects they have within the sector have 
been commented on elsewhere (see ‘Silly, Soft and Otherwise Suspect: Doctoral 
education as risky business’, McWilliam et al, 2005). The authors found, through 
their national research study of risk and doctoral education1, that the degree of 
scandalworthiness was proportional to the shock value of the alleged breach (sexual 
misconduct still the most likely to sell newspapers) but also the extent to which a 
particular university is thought to have covered up or trivialised a breach of ethics 
and/or misconduct. Where doctoral students or academic staff become 
‘whistleblowers’, alleging misconduct on the part of supervisors or fellow academics 
(e.g., (The Sydney Morning Herald, 24 Dec, 2003, p.2; The Australian, 29 December 
2003, p.1; The Sunday Times, 30 October 2005, p.1), reputations are very quickly 
imperiled. Reputational rehabilitation is a long and often demanding and uncertain 
climb back to respectability for the university concerned. Where the scandal involves 
                                                 
1 This is a three year study of the Impact of Risk Management on Higher Degree Research 
Policy and Pedagogy in Australian Universities, funded by the Australia Research 
Council for the period 2004-2006.   
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falsely claiming a doctorate (eg, The Courier Mail, 6 Jan, 2004, p.1), and the 
allegation is substantiated by means of a formal inquiry, the individual academic 
cannot hope for rehabilitation, given the stigma that attaches to bogus qualifications 
as fraud.   
 
Every allegation of this type, once made and re-made in the public domain, triggers a 
“risk event” (Kasperson et al, 1998), with serious implications for the university in 
question and also for the sector if it is alleged also to be ‘typical’ of universities in 
general or even of a sub-set of universities. The problem is exacerbated if the risk 
event follows close on the heels of similar allegations or negative reports about the 
activities of the sector. The fact that a risk event has occurred does not mean that the 
allegation is true, but it does mean trouble for the university as an organisation. 
Assuming that the investigation of risk is both “a scientific activity and an expression 
of culture” (Kasperson et al, 1998: 149), it becomes possible to track the means by 
which an apparently minor risk can produce significant negative public reaction. 
According to Kasperson et al, a risk event is usually “specific to a particular time and 
location”, but comes to “interact with psychological, social and cultural processes” so 
as to “heighten or attenuate public perceptions of risk and related risk behaviour” 
(p.150). An allegation of ‘university scandal’ then, gains the status of a risk event if 
and when it interacts with other socio-cultural processes to produce behaviours that 
serve to increase the perceived danger, triggering demands for “additional 
organizational response and protective actions or impeding needed protective actions” 
(p.151). Thus, for example, if widespread public anxiety already exists about 
employment prospects in general, and their implications for professional workers in 
particular, an allegation of bogus credentialing is likely to have a more powerful 
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impact both outside and within the sector under scrutiny. Moreover, any additional 
responses are likely to generate new risks for the sector, as risk loops back upon itself 
in a double play, proliferating the actions and reactions that constitute its 
management.  
 
A useful example of this double play of risk is to be found in the ‘CCTV Voyeur 
scandal’ at the University of Warwick (see Williams, 2005). The University’s 
attempts to attend to the risk of less than satisfactory security for students who were 
campus residents generated a further risk, that of the voyeuristic possibilities that 
security cameras afforded individual members of the security staff. The risk was 
compounded again when staff members who were “caught zooming security cameras 
into students’ rooms” accused the University of “bullying” them into resignation 
during the inquiry into this allegation. Allegations of a “cover-up” created yet another 
problem for university managers, who chose not to “complicate the issue” by 
inform[ing] the “victims”, who were “now in their latter years of study”. For 
managers seeking to do the least reputational and personal harm, the challenges were 
demanding indeed: both of the options - acting or not acting - brought considerable 
risk to the reputation of the university.    
 
Minimising danger  
 
While in theory at least, risk management ought to be about about both the judicious 
taking - as well as minimising - of risk, increasingly we see that risk management is 
usually focused almost exclusively on the latter of these two imperatives. It is evoked 
as a response to all potential troubles, whether publicly sensational or less visible but 
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equally worrying matters like managing any fall-out from government funding cuts. 
According to scholars like Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck, this focus on ‘trouble’ 
minimisation is in keeping with risk-consciousness as a more general “a moral climate 
of politics” (Giddens, 2002, p.29) in post-millennial times. “Risk society”, as Beck 
describes it, is characterized by negative logic, a shift away from the management and 
distribution of material/industrial ‘goods’ to the management and distribution of 
‘bads’, ie, the control of knowledge about danger, about what might go wrong and 
about the systems needed to guard against such a possibility. This is the sort of focus 
that is evident, for example, in senior bureaucrat Michael Gallagher’s (2000) 
summation of the ‘trouble’ with Australian universities at the turn of the millennium. 
He stated then that there were “a number of failures” (p.38) that could be linked to the 
“trial and error dimension” of university management practice up to that time. Despite 
common regulations across the sector, the lack of uniformity of practice within 
universities would now be under scrutiny as the key culprit in producing failure. “The 
next phase of development”, Gallagher concluded, “…can be expected to be more 
formalised and professionally risk managed” (p.38).  
 
This recent negative connotation of ‘risk’ is at odds with its historic emergence as an 
idea that pre-figured capitalism, “the epitome of risk-taking” (Bernstein, 1998: 21). 
Derived from the Portuguese verb ‘to dare’, ‘risk’ evoked a condition of excited 
anticipation in relation to sixteenth century sea-faring, and has such had a much more 
positive spin than the modern notion of risk as hazard minimisation. As Anthony 
Giddens (2002) reminds us, the modernist notion of risk – of  “hazards that are 
actively assessed in relation to future possibilities” (p.22) is one that could only be 
thought after magic, cosmology and  the fates had given way to the sort of scientific 
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calculation that gave rise to forecasting, bookkeeping and insurance. What we have 
witnessed in more recent times is risk as “tak[ing] a chance” to risk as “cold 
calculation” (Keynes, in Bernstein, 1998: 12). 
 
According to Giddens (2002), this modernist climate of cold, calculated risk is 
“marked by a push and pull between accusations of scaremongering on the one hand, 
and of cover-ups on the other” (p.29). This push and pull of risk is evidenced both 
within and outside organisational life, as claims and counter-claims constitute certain 
matters as more or less ‘risky’ or certain people as more or less ‘at risk’. This does not 
mean that risk-as-danger is not ‘real’. Rather, it means that risk-consciousness as a 
moral climate of cold calculation is now the logic for thinking social and 
organisational good. So risk management-as-risk-minimisation has become a high 
priority, institution-wide system of communication in all Western organisations, 
including universities.  
 
While the logic of risk management has been characterised as negative, it is 
interesting to note the ways in which this negative logic is re-framed through its 
articulation as institutional policy and incitements to action. As “a system of 
regulatory measures intended to shape who can take what risks and how” (Pigeon, et 
al, 1992: 136), risk management comes with the most rational and balanced of 
epithets in educational policy documents. Its “developmental knowledge” (Hobart, 
1993), couched as it is “predominantly in the idiom of economics, technology and 
management” (p.2), rather than the idiom of academic, theoretical or disciplinary 
knowledge, draws on conceptual models that are “generalisable or appear to offer the 
greatest predictability or the semblance of control over events” (p.9). Because 
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publicly funded organisations like universities must manage reputation as vigorously 
as their internal processes, they “have to work within pre-established guidelines and 
assume that particular conditions fit a general mould” (p.9). In Vitebsky’s (1993) 
terms, this means utilising models of management that “apply…to everywhere and 
nowhere, everybody and nobody” (p.100).   
  
The mobilisation of risk minimisation through economic, technological and 
management knowledge is occurring, not co-incidentally, at a time when Western 
governments are re-positioning themselves as buyers of education services rather than 
patrons of education. In the new educational market, ‘post-welfare’ universities are 
scrambling to demonstrate their utility to any and all potential sponsors. This means, 
among other things, a new vision of the university and its management, which 
demands, in turn, the denunciation of traditionally accepted forms of organisation (du 
Gay, 1991; 1994).  
 
As social organisations, universities have been called upon to ‘re-vision’ themselves 
as workplaces with much to learn from “studies of other businesses” about the 
relation between employees’ attitudes and company performance (Ramsden, 1998: 
39). A key proposition here is that universities “are not intrinsically different from 
other organisations”, in terms of their need to understand and adopt the following 
premise:    
 
The better the attitude the better the profitability and the productivity. The 
better the staff development and people management, the better the capacity of 
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the organisation to adapt to new demands, new technologies and to maintain 
its position in the market. (Ramsden, 1998: p. 39) 
 
Maintaining one’s position in the market is certainly at risk, as indicated above, when 
public accusations are made of scandalous or suspect conduct. But more telling still, 
because of the long-term impacts on a university’s revenue stream, is the risk of 
failing to make the grade sinking on sector-wide and public league tables. It is for 
these reasons, that greater vigilance, in the form of more demonstrated capacity for 
accountability and self-audit, has emerged as a key investment for the sector. In 
Michel Foucault’s (1980) terminology, risk-as-danger now works as a “regime of 
truth” (p.131) that constitutes proper (ie, risk-conscious) social and organisational 
conduct. It organises  “the games of truth and error” (Foucault, 1985: 6) that shape 
universities as contemporary social organisations. As a hegemonic logic for naming 
what is good practice, risk-consciousness provides a “prescriptive text…that 
elaborate[s] rules, opinions and advice as to how to behave as one should” (p. 12), 
allowing all employees to “question their own conduct, to watch over and give shape 
to it, and to shape themselves as ethical subjects” (p. 13) through utilising rhe same 
logic that applies to the organisation as a whole. Put another way, “cold calculation” 
has come to provide a script for being properly professional, one that invariably 
requires alertness to potential dangers and greater attention to the calculability of risk 
within the institution.   
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As a ‘regime of truth’, risk consciousness produces a language for naming, thinking 
and seeing danger2. In accusations made against the higher education sector, the 
descriptor ‘soft’ is a marker of the application of this consciousness. When attached to 
specific university practices – eg, soft marking, soft entry, soft standards even soft 
staffing, it marks potential trouble, and thus the need for the university to galvanise 
itself by implementing new management processes that assure more accountability 
and better quality in the domain of practice under scrutiny.  
 
The key point about allegations of ‘softness’ is that ‘soft practice’ is neither a ‘true’ 
(absolute) nor a ‘distorted’ (socially determined) risk within the sector. The terms 
‘soft marking’, ‘soft entry’ and so on, are knowledge objects that have been invented, 
and then discovered to exist in particular universities under particular conditions.  
This is not to say that an allegation of ‘soft marking’ is entirely fictive – merely to 
argue that it is a term which arises at this point in history to make a particular kind of 
sense (about assessment processes) and so to do a certain kind of work in governing 
academic practices. As an allegation, soft marking is a call to action for any university 
fearing negative attention from potential markets, governments, other funding bodies, 
and/or the general community. When this comes in the form of a ‘scandal sheet’, it 
has the power to mobilize an entire organizational culture in its own defence. The 
responsive (ie, well-managed) institution will ensure that ‘softness’ can never alleged 
in the first place.    
 
Allegations of softness are particularly anxiety-producing when they arise in relation 
to the awarding of doctorates, because a doctorate represents the highest award for 
                                                 
2 Jo Tobin’s research provides a useful example of how professional workers come to ‘see’ risk danger 
in a particular cultural context where others do not.   
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academic excellence that can be given by any university. ‘Soft’ assessment means that 
the highest award is in danger and this is danger indeed for a university’s reputation in 
terms of the quality of its activities and outputs. So ‘softness’ becomes “a collective, 
organizational issue” (Delamont et al, 1997: 3), to be responded to with heighten 
surveillance at every level. In “Human Error” (1990), James Reason provides an 
insight into the means by which all levels of an organisation are mobilised in the 
service of risk mitigation. His book draws on a number of catastrophic human error 
events (such as Bhopal, Challenger, Chernobyl, and so on) to conceptualise risk 
mitigation as a cascade of error in a complex network of systems. Reason’s 
representation of the dynamics of accident causation, which has become known as the 
‘Swiss Cheese’ model, shows how a trajectory of accident “penetrat[es]…several 
defensive systems” (Reason, 1990, p. 208), each of which contain “local triggers, 
intrinsic defects, and atypical conditions”. His model highlights those risk factors that 
are part of the operational and managerial make-up of the organisational system as a 
defence against risk. Of course, it would be an absurdity to suggest that a risk event 
involving dishonesty in a university would be as world-shattering as a Chernobyl. 
However, what Reason’s model can do is provide a template for tracking the risk-
mitigating processes that are demanding more and more attention from academics as 
risk managers.  
 
 
Academics as risk managers 
 
What we have found in our on-going study of the impact of risk management on 
doctoral education in Australia (McWilliam, Taylor, Lawson and Evans, 2004-2006) 
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is that, while risk minimisation logic is ramping up accountabilities across the entire 
university spectrum, few if any academics understand themselves to be ‘risk 
managers’; most remain wedded to the “unique, informal culture” (Ericson and 
Haggerty, 1997: 57) that characterises academics’ traditional work as teachers and 
researchers. This makes for tensions between how much time academics ought to give 
to the knowledge they need as ‘expert’ managers of students and systems, and to 
local, disciplinary-specific or ‘craft’ knowledge. It is not that they are being required 
to displace the latter altogether, but they now are being required to understand it as 
only part of a much larger domain of  ‘professional [academic] expertise’. Ericson and 
Haggerty (1997) elaborate on this idea as one that is changing the nature of 
professions more generally:     
 
[P]rofessionals obviously have ‘know-how’, [but] their ‘know-how’ does not 
become expertise until it is plugged into an institutional communication 
system. It is through such systems that expert knowledge becomes 
standardized and robust enough to use in routine diagnosis, classification, and 
treatment decisions by professionals.  (p.104)  
 
To be a good academic in a good (ie, risk-conscious) university is to be a professional 
expert, and to be a professional expert is to share with other ‘learning managers’ an 
“attentional economy” (Taylor, 2005) that is focused on minimising risk to the 
institution. This in turn requires academics to be “plugged into” to the burgeoning 
systems of accountability that are now being used to “diagnose, classify and treat” 
students, staff and stakeholders alike. The “audit explosion” (Strathern, 1997) that has 
been occurring for some time now in higher education management is evidence of this 
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imperative at work in all levels of the university as a risk-conscious organization. As 
Marilyn Strathern (1997; 2000) explains, the audit culture works as a defence against 
systemic arbitrariness, by applying mechanisms designed to ensure organizational 
precision for coping with (appropriate) social imprecision. The logic here, as 
Strathern understands it, is that systems of management need to be uniform because 
individuals are not, nor are likely to be. This logic of procedural equity runs counter 
to the idea that is espoused in some quarters that audit cultures are intentionally 
depersonalising. While the audit explosion may have depersonalizing effects, the logic 
of the intensive bureaucratic monitoring that characterizes audit culture is not ‘one-
size-fits-all’ in terms of the individuals who are its ‘products’. What is standard is the 
particular model for measuring organizational performance. In this way it is possible 
to argue that ‘individual differences’ are catered for at the same time that any claims 
that a particular university may make are able to be more precisely monitored and 
justified by way of league tables and similar comparative data systems. In this way 
each university can demonstrate or otherwise its accountability for its spending, 
regardless of whether or not that funding derives from the public purse.     
 
While few would deny the importance of an ethic of public accountability, it is 
important to understand what else is made possible through the logic of danger 
minimisation. The rise of a public demand for waste identification and eradication 
does more than require accountability in that it frames higher education in general as a 
‘scarce’ resource rather than as available to the many. Alan Lawson (1999) puts it this 
way:  
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Because higher education is valued, it is potentially a commodity. But it is 
only a commodity worth paying for if it can be made to seem scarce. Once it is 
scarce it can be competed for, accounted for, and subjected to audits that will 
inevitably disclose how those scarce resources are being wasted…higher 
degree education…has been redefined as a ‘scarce’ commodity which we can 
ill-afford to ‘waste’.  (p.11) 
 
Lawson goes on to show how conflations of higher degree student data relating to 
attrition and completion rates make the entire field vulnerable to accusations of waste.  
Most importantly, he indicates that such accusations, once made, continue to be fed 
by dubious claims about the irrelevance of much higher degree study and employer 
dissatisfaction with higher degree graduates (p.11). What Lawson draws attention to 
is that the imperative to perform effective risk minimisation in higher education works 
as a tactic for de-limiting the resources individual universities, and the sector itself, 
will be allocated. This means that universities are under greater pressure to consider 
cutting back on certain services and functions. It is not that governments are 
‘interfering’ directly in the internal workings of universities. Rather, government 
funding flows to those universities that are seen to be the most effective performers, 
with effective performance being framed by those governments through standard 
measures of ‘productivity’. The logic here is thoroughly rational – the stronger the 
quality case, the more funding can be anticipated. And of course, the reverse is also 
true.  
 
What is so important here is that there is no space ‘outside’ this logic – it is the 
condition of unfreedom within which all publicly funded universities go about their 
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business. And increasingly their business is to require at every level the sort of tough 
self-regulation that can identify ‘waste’ and guard against declining standards. This 
means, among other things, the ability to make a case that excellence has been 
achieved in teaching, research or service, and a concomitant ability to identify and 
eliminate ‘soft’ activity, that is, to cut any expenditure that is demonstrated to be 
value-adding quality. No practice is immune from this forensic scrutiny. Performance 
Indicators are set to be met. Cost-benefit analyses decide the ‘best’ composition of 
fulltime to part-time or casual staff. And so the thoroughly reasonable logic of audit is 
brought to bear on the nearly reasonable problems of the university. The space 
between the reasonable and the nearly reasonable becomes a space that is rendered 
unthinkable.      
 
This does not mean an end to criticism from within. Indeed, the more demanding that 
audit requirement have become, the more we have seen a burgeoning literature of 
trenchant critique that is genuinely global in its scope. From Ronald Barnett’s (1997) 
call for a revival of criticality in higher education in the UK, to Susan DiGiacomo’s 
(1999) identification of a “new internal colonialism” in Spanish universities, to Cris 
Shore and Susan Wright’s (1999) shared critique of audit cultures in New Zealand 
and Danish universities, to Kenway and Bullen’s (2000) concerns about Australian 
“[e]ducation in the age of uncertainty”  to William Tierney’s (2001) concerns about 
the loss of academic freedom in the USA– all these scholars point to a common 
disillusionment with the nature and purposes of post-millennial higher education, and 
an increasing negativity among academics about the new attentional economy that is 
an effect of the hegemony of audit.                 
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While I have empathy with broad thrust of these authors’ concerns, it seems to me 
that they ignore almost completely the fact that the sort of self-shaping necessary to 
becoming a risk-conscious, calculating professional expert has its seductions as well 
as its de-limitations. To explore what is ‘in it’ for academics to self-fashion as 
‘excellent’, it is necessary to acknowledge more than the specific performativities that 
come with a risk-conscious culture of audit. Specifically, we need to acknowledge 
that, once it is possible to quantify quality on a global scale, winners become highly 
visible and highly valued highly, whatever our concerns might be about how that 
calculation is arrived at. Those universities which have the resources and reputational 
clout to aspire to be at the top of a league table can and do advantage the academic 
staff whose identity is closely aligned with their institutional reputation. There is a 
significant group of academics whose catchcry is ‘bring on the league tables – at least 
we all then know where we are and where we need to get to!” David Mulcahy would 
want to reply that this aspiration is not to a high standard of scholarship, but to “a high 
standard of standardness” (in Brenneis, Shore and Wright, 2003, p.7). Nevertheless, 
we do need to acknowledge, whether willing or no, that a culture of rewards, awards, 
of vertical ladders and carrot-shaped sticks, does promise certain academics that their 
‘excellence’ will count, in the literal as well as metaphorical sense.    
 
It is also worth noting what else is going on in universities alongside the hyper-
rationality of the call to ‘measure up’ as academics and as risk managers. There has 
been for some time now a call to ‘making up’ (du Gay, 1991; 1994) academics as 
organisational leaders and managers. In Australian universities, Departments of 
Human Resources have been for some time worked to develop individuals whose 
personal and professional lives are not just inseparable but imbued with precise 
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dispositional qualities. Senior academics, like their counterparts in business 
organisations, are called to conduct a journey of self-discovery (Senge, 1992) at both 
the personal and professional level, so that they can learn the discipline of what we 
shall call for convenience, the three Cs: caring passionately about their role in an 
organisation, thinking creatively about their work, and communicating effectively to 
achieve their goals. Communicative excellence is now characterised by warmth, 
rather than distance, power-sharing rather than domination, and coaching rather than 
coercion and control (Cameron, 2000).  
 
This new model of leaderly performance augments rather than detracts from 
organisational efficiency and good managerial practice, and the achievement of high 
quality soft skills is the currency of emotionally intelligent successful leaders 
(Goleman, Boyatzis & McKee, 2002). Armed with both a hyper-rational script for 
risk managing, and a script for self-fashioning around the right sort of irrationality, 
the excellent leader/manager knows when and how to plug into hyper-rational 
systems and when and how to eschew rationality in favour of deep mutual 
interpersonal confluence. This confluence of two apparently distinct paradigms is 
captured, in some sense at least, in the term “emotional capital” (Thomson, 1998). 
The imperative is here to capitalise, whether it is to capitalise our feelings or our 
knowledge – both can be rendered calculable and both must be put to work in the 
interests of ‘excellent’ performance.    
 
Concluding remarks 
To conclude, let us return to G.K Chesterton. Investment in personal and professional 
‘excellence’ is in many respects eminently reasonable. The trap is that our problems, 
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our beliefs – and indeed, our disciplinary cultures themselves – cannot be relied on to 
be amenable to this logic, hew them as we may. While it is important that we do not 
underestimate the usefulness – as well as the seductions - of being a ‘self-developing, 
‘risk-conscious’ professional expert, it is also important to name the less charming 
absurdities of rendering academic performance calculable to ourselves and others. 
The invitation to performative excellence – as individuals, as leaders, as risk 
managers - is one that all academics ought to feel free to refuse.       
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